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ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE-AN
ALTERNATIVE TO THE FRYE RULE
ANDRE A. MOENSSENS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Frye rule1 has different meanings for forensic scientists,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges. To forensic scientists
and prosecutors, the Frye rule is an obstacle that often excludes
evidence based on novel scientific techniques. Although the Frye
rule also prevents the defendant's novel scientific evidence from
reaching the jury, defense attorneys and the few forensic scientists
who work with the defense bar see the rule as an ineffective barrier
to unreliable prosecution evidence. The meaning of the Frye rule
to judges is less clear. Many judges do not perceive the rule as a
significant issue.2
The importance of the Frye rule initially was not apparent. The
only unusual feature about Frye was that it was the first case in
which the admissibility of evidence from a lie detector instrument
* Professor of Law and Director of the Institute for Trial Advocacy, University of Rich-
mond; Forensic Consultant. J.D. 1966, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; LL.M. 1967, Northwestern University.
1. The Frye rule, enunciated by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, imposes on proponents of novel scientific evidence the burden of estab-
lishing that the scientific technique or principle in question has "gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs." Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923). See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
2. At a symposium sponsored by the National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists in
April 1983, Michael Graham related his experience in dealing with trial judges at annual
conferences over the past six years. He reported that, of all the topics discussed, "none was
as unpopular with the judges as scientific evidence." Symposium on Science and the Rules
of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 220 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Symposium Report]. He contin-
ued: "No matter how hard we tried, we could not elicit any excitement about the Frye test.
They acted as if the issue just did not come up in their courtrooms." Id. at 221.
The author has had many similar experiences in discussing scientific evidence with judges.
Graham's lament, "How can we expect the attorneys to be concerned about scientific evi-
dence if the judges do not perceive it as a problem?," is a serious one. Id. This concern is
related to the scientific illiteracy of judges and lawyers. See infra notes 27-54 and accompa-
nying text.
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was at issue.8 The opinion was brief and cited no authority for the
rule it announced.4 Although the Frye rule did not gain immediate
judicial acceptance, the rule gradually spread throughout state and
federal courts and became the generally accepted legal test for the
admissiblity of novel scientific evidence. Since the late 1960's,
courts have cited Frye in virtually every criminal prosecution deal-
ing with a novel form of expert evidence.
Courts have treated the Frye rule as a conservative approach to
deciding whether to admit test results based on novel scientific
techniques or experiments.5 Many courts favor a conservative ap-
proach because juries may be overly impressed by experts with
seemingly impressive credentials. Additionally, juries may give
greater weight to expert opinions than the opinions deserve on the
basis of scientific validity. Courts, therefore, have exercised consid-
erable restraint when dealing with evidence based on principles
that have not been proven sufficiently reliable, or when confronting
techniques that engender results not readily replicable by others in
the scientific field. By excluding evidence that fails to satisfy the
Frye rule, courts have sought to shield jurors from the influence of
testimony that might sound more impressive than it actually is.
A conservative test-one that will not permit the prosecution or
the defense to use evidence based on tests of unproven reliabil-
ity-is especially commendable in criminal cases, in which the
technical inquiry is directed toward resolving the ultimate issue of
guilt.' When scientific tests purport to identify the defendant as
the guilty party,7 courts must screen out those techniques that do
not invariably point to the guilty party. Otherwise, the jury might
be deceived.
This Article analyzes the Frye rule, and demonstrates why the
3. See infra text accompanying notes 8-9.
4. The brevity of the Frye decision belies its importance. As Professor Starts remarked,
"the creation of the world, a far less trifling affair [than Frye], was told in a mere 600
words." Starts, A Still-Life Watercolor. Frye v. United States, 27 J. FORENSIC Sci. 684
(1982) (manuscript).
5. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
6. Some authorities have suggested, however, that general acceptance should not be the
standard for admissibility, but for taking judicial notice. See MCCORMucK's HANDBOOK OF
THm LAW OF EVIENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMCK].
7. Evidence that purports to positively identify individuals includes fingerprint compari-
sons, sound spectrography, bitemark impressions, and handwriting analyses.
546 [Vol. 25:545
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rule remains a significant issue. Examining a variety of problems
that have arisen under the rule, the Article concludes that the rule
does not adequately screen novel scientific techniques. The Article
concludes, therefore, by advocating the abandonment of Frye, and
by proposing a new procedure to determine the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence.
IE. THE Frye RULE--GENESIS, ANALYSIS, AND THE NEED FOR
CHANGE
In Frye v. United States,8 the defendant attempted to introduce
evidence of a novel systolic blood pressure deception test, the first
of the so-called "lie detectors" and the ancestor of the modern pol-
ygraph. The defendant wanted to offer expert testimony showing
that, when he was examined, he had denied truthfully any involve-
ment in the crime for which he was charged. The trial court sus-
tained the government's objection to the evidence and refused the
defendant's request to be tested in the presence of the jury.9 On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit upheld the trial court's exclusion of the evidence
because the defendant had not proven that the technique was
reliable.10
In its opinion, the appellate court formulated a sweeping princi-
ple to guide future courts in deciding whether to admit evidence
derived from new scientific processes, instruments, or techniques:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recog-
nized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs."
8. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
9. Id. at 1014.
10. Id.
11. Id. Countless court opinions, articles, and books have quoted this passage. See, e.g., A.
MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, ScxrNT'ic EvmiENcE w CRaMNAL CAsES § 1.03 (2d ed. 1978); Gian-
nelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
1984]
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This principle has become known as the Frye rule, or the general
acceptance test. The rule posits that evidence based on a new sci-
entific investigative technique or instrumental analysis will be ad-
mitted only after the proponent has established that the field or
discipline to which the technique belongs generally has accepted
the technique as reliable in its results, replicable by other qualified
workers in the discipline, and based upon sound scientific princi-
ples. The rule, however, is easier to state than to apply. An exami-
nation of some problems that have arisen under the rule demon-
strates the difficulty and highlights the need for change.
A. Determining the Field to Which a Technique Belongs
To apply the Frye rule, a court first must determine the field to
which a new technique belongs. In Frye, the court determined that
the lie detector belonged to the fields of psychology and physiol-
ogy.12 Some courts have determined the proper field without diffi-
culty, but other courts have had difficulty with this step of the
analysis.13 Occasionally, new techniques compound the problem by
combining elements of several disciplines, with no discipline claim-
ing the novel process as its own. An imaginative expert who devel-
ops a new technique may be considered radical by his conservative
peers, who may reject the technique regardless of its validity. 4 Al-
ternatively, a discipline may accept a new technique simply be-
cause the technique promotes the overall objectives of the disci-
pline.15 The discipline might accept the new technique, therefore,
Later, 80 COLuM. L. REv. 1197, 1204-05 (1980); Graham, Relevancy and the Exclusion of
Relevant Evidence: Admissibility of Evidence of a Scientific Principle or Tech-
nique-Application of the Frye Test, 19 Cam. L. BuLL. 51, 52 (1983); Imwinkelried, The
Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psy-
chology, 28 VmL. L. Rlv. 554, 556 n.18 (1983); Starrs, supra note 4.
12. Interestingly, neither the practitioners of psychology nor the practitioners of physiol-
ogy have claimed the lie detector as appropriately belonging to their field.
13. See, e.g., People v. Slone, 76 Cal. App. 3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1978) (bitemark
identification belongs in "the community of dentistry"); Cornett v. State, - Ind.
450 N.E.2d 498 (1983) (the relevant scientific community for spectrographic voice identifica-
tion should include linguists, psychologists, and engineers, in addition to the people who use
voice spectrography for identification purposes).
14. Moenssens, Requiem for the "General Acceptance" Standard in Forensic Sci-
ence-Some Whimsical Thoughts on the Battle of Frye v. The Federal Rules of Evidence,
in 1982 LEGAL MED. ANN. 275, 276 (C. Wecht ed.).
15. Id.
[Vol. 25:545.548
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without requiring objective scientific validation of the underlying
postulates."6
A vivid example of a discipline's acceptance of a technique with-
out requiring scientific validation is the development of the
voiceprint technique-the revolutionary method of identifying
speakers by comparing their voices with a sound spectrograph. The
technique is a byproduct of radio communications and audiology.
A third discipline, fingerprint identification, recognized the
voiceprint as a potentially useful law enforcement tool. The three
different disciplines spawned a fourth one, the entirely new field of
voiceprint examination.17
The budding field of sound spectrographic voice identification
illustrates the difficulty of applying the Frye rule. Must the tech-
nique be generally accepted by the field of radio communications,
speech and audiology, fingerprint identification, or voiceprint ex-
amination? Radio communication and fingerprint identification
have no direct connection with voiceprints and can be discarded as
sponsor disciplines.' 8 Audiology and speech analysis rejected the
premises on which the new technique was based,"' leaving only the
new discipline of voiceprint examination.
With the exception of the professor of audiology who embraced
the voiceprint after initially spuming it and the electrical engineer
who first coined the name "voiceprint," the only other early exam-
iners were law enforcement officers who lacked training in scien-
tific inquiry and validation. After one court finally admitted
16. Id.
17. Id. For a description of the development of this new discipline and of its professional
association, the International Association of Voiceprint Identification, see A. MonNssEzs &
F. INBAU, supra note 11, § 12.08. The organization has since been dissolved and its members
have been absorbed by the International Association for Identification, an association of
crime laboratory specialists, primarily fingerprint experts. That association currently has a
Voice Identification and Acoustic Analysis Section Certification Program, and has attracted
additional scientifically inclined members. For details on the credentialing process, see InDN-
TInCATION N.ws, Dec. 1982, at 5.
18. A "sponsor" discipline is one which may contibute or relate to the technique in ques-
tion, but which is not the principle user of the technique.
19. Many speech and audiology specialists use the sound spectrograph in connection with
their work. The majority, however, reject the underlying premise upon which the narrow
field of voiceprint identification relies, voice uniqueness, because the premise has never been
empirically established.
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voiceprint evidence,20 other appellate courts began to uphold the
admission of voiceprint evidence, concluding that the technique
satisfied the Frye test.21 In every case, experts testified that
voiceprint identification was accurate and reliable; and each appel-
late decision allowed other courts to follow more comfortably the
growing number of precedents. The trend in favor of admitting
voiceprints continued until a group of lawyers discovered that, in
each case, the same two or three experts had been the proponents
who bestowed "general acceptance" on the technique.
This discovery brought the trend to a halt in People v. Kelly.22
In Kelly, the California Supreme Court declared unanimously that
the reliability of voiceprint identification could not be established
by proof of its acceptance among a limited group of individuals
whose professional careers depended on the reliability of the pro-
cess.23 The court stated that general acceptance requires validation
by disinterested scientists, and that testimony by law enforcement
technicians who lacked scientific training was insufficient. 24 Wit-
nesses who lack scientific training cannot "fairly and impartially
assess the position of the scientific community. '25 Following Kelly,
several other appellate courts reached the same conclusion, 6 thus
20. United States v. Wright, 17 C.M.A. 183, 37 C.M.R. 447 (1967).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Williams, 443
F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr.
547 (1973); Ilea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Worley v. State, 263 So.
2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671
(1975); Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971); State v. Olderman, 44
Ohio App. 2d 130, 336 N.E.2d 442 (1975).
Not all jurisdictions, of course, found that voiceprint evidence satisfied the Frye test. See,
e.g., United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States v. Addison, 498
F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974);
People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 CaL Rptr. 478 (1968); State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343,
230 A.2d 384 (1967), aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970).
22. 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976).
23. Id. at 38, 549 P.2d at 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
24. Id. at 38-39, 549 P.2d at 1249-50, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153-54.
25. Id. at 38, 549 P.2d at 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
26. See, e.g., Cornett v. State, - Ind. , 450 N.E.2d 498 (1983) (the relevant scien-
tific community for spectrographic voice identification is not limited to those who use spec-
trography for identification purposes, but includes linguists, psychologists, and engineers);
People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977) (general scientific acceptance may
not be established without the testimony of disinterested and impartial experts whose liveli-
hood was not intimately connected with the new technique); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471
550
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halting the trend toward admitting voiceprint evidence.
B. Causes of False General Acceptance
Several factors may have contributed to the initial judicial ac-
ceptance of voiceprint evidence. The most important factor, how-
ever, was the ignorance of both judges and lawyers about scientific
issues. Many appellate judges simply do not understand evidence
based on scientific principles. 27  More importantly, judges fre-
quently misunderstand the evidence by overlooking attributes of
the evidence, as well as by ascribing attributes to the evidence that
it lacks.
A principle announced in Schmerber v. California28 illustrates
this misunderstanding. In Schmerber, the police had compelled the
defendant to give a blood sample following his arrest for driving
under the influence of alcohol. The defendant argued that the po-
lice should have obtained a warrant before administering the blood
Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977) (the testimony of an expert witness, who was a law enforce-
ment officer and who had made a career of traveling around the country testifying about the
functions and acceptance of voiceprints, was insufficient to establish general acceptance).
Some courts are now beginning to accept voiceprint evidence again. See, e.g., United
States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1983); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978);
State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983).
27. The lack of understanding is not limited to appellate judges, but extends to trial
judges, as well as to most lawyers. See Symposium Report, supra note 2, at 220-21. Another
symposium commentator, Professor Joseph Nicol, a criminalistics educator and forensic sci-
entist, indicted the entire legal community when he lamented:
Appellate decisions often are simply appalling in the degree of scientific na-
ivete displayed. Subsequent decisions then rest upon them as precedent for the
validity or general acceptance of a scientific procedure....
An even more important consideration is the inability of the defense bar to
handle scientific matters. The sad truth is that those attorneys simply are inca-
pable by education, and all too often by inclination, to become suffidiently fa-
miliar with scientific evidence to discharge their responsibilities toward the ad-
ministration of justice. The scientific illiteracy of nearly all lawyers is a
disgrace to their profession. The fault lies equally with the individual lawyers
and the legal profession, including law schools and bar associations.
Id. at 221.
Professor Michael Graham commented that "[an underlying problem is that lawyers do
not understand science, including the fundamentals of the scientific method and the tech-
niques by which scientific evidence is generated." Id. at 232. Similarly, Professor Margaret
Berger noted "the lack of scientific literacy on the part of most defense attorneys." Id. at
233. Prosecutors fare no better, but they typically are supported in their efforts by the
state's expert witnesses. Id.
28. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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test. The United States Supreme Court held that the evanescent
quality of blood and other body fluids, and the need to preserve
the evidence of intoxication, permitted the police to take a blood
sample without first obtaining a warrant.29 Because the blood-alco-
hol level changes as the body metabolizes alcohol, police must ob-
tain a blood sample immediately to measure accurately the blood-
alcohol concentration at the time of arrest.
Unfortunately, courts have not always interpreted Schmerber
sensibly. In Ortega v. State,30 a police officer had observed several
bloodstained items in the bedroom of a murder suspect. The officer
notified a detective who then seized the bloodstained evidence
without a warrant. The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the of-
ficers had the right to seize the evidence without a warrant because
the evidentiary value of blood and body fluids diminishes with
time,3 1 a point recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Schmerber.3 2 The majority apparently did not believe that evi-
dence of bloodstains for the purpose of determining the blood type
is very stable, and not evanescent-a fact known by all forensic
serologists. Blood type will not deteriorate quickly and apprecia-
bly, as will the blood-alcohol concentration of an intoxicated
driver. As the dissent accurately noted, even dried bloodstains are
stable and can be typed months after the stains were left.33 Yet,
because Schmerber dealt with evidence involving blood, the court
in Ortega thoughtlessly applied the Schmerber ruling to the evi-
dence before it, apparently reasoning that the purpose for which
blood is analyzed is irrelevant. 4
Another example of judicial misunderstanding of scientific evi-
29. Id. at 770-71. The evanescent quality was not the blood itself, but the measurable
level of alcohol in the blood of the suspected drunken driver.
30. 669 P.2d 935 (Wyo. 1983).
31. Id. at 942.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 946 (Rose, J., dissenting); see also Stone, Capabilities of Modern Forensic Lab-
oratories, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 659, 668 (1984).
34. Another famous blood-typing case is Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d
442 (1946). In a paternity suit against Charlie Chaplin, the court held that although the
scientific evidence of the blood tests conclusively established that Chaplin could not have
been the father, the jury was not bound to accept this scientifically immutable fact and
could find that the plaintiff had established paternity. To support the jury's factfinding, the
court noted that Chaplin had been required to stand in front of the jury next to the plaintiff
and her child, so as to permit a visual comparison-hardly a test of scientific value!
[Vol. 25:545
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dence occurred in Smith v. State.35 In Smith, the court considered
for the first time whether the results of a psychological stress
evaluator (PSE), a device designed to detect deception by an ex-
amination of the voice, were admissible. The theory underlying the
technique is that a person's voice emits both audible sound fre-
quencies and a series of inaudible frequency sound waves."6 The
examiner feeds the recorded voice tape into a PSE, "which is simi-
lar to an electrocardiogram machine. '3 7 From an examination of
the printed frequency bands of the sound, the examiner purports
to determine whether the speaker is telling the truth. 8
The court in Smith compared the device's accuracy to that of
the "lie detector."3 9 The court concluded that Maryland had re-
jected "the art of lie detecting" because it generated unreliable re-
sults, 40 and the court, therefore, rejected the PSE results.4 1 The
court reasoned that "[t]he difference, if any, between the psycho-
logical stress evaluation test and a lie detector test is too minor
and shadowy to justify a departure from our prior decision. A lie
detector test by any other name is still a lie detector test. 4 2 A
similarity might exist between the nature of the PSE technique
and the voiceprint spectrographic examination. No similarity ex-
ists, however, between the techniques of the PSE and the poly-
graph, although both seek the same result. The court demon-
strated a lack of understanding of scientific evidence in its refusal
to recognize the differences between scientific techniques.
A final example41 of the lack of judicial understanding of scien-
tific evidence involved gunpowder residue testing. In 1933, a Mexi-
can criminalist developed the paraffin test to prove that a person
35. 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976).
36. Id. at 119, 355 A.2d at 535.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 119-20, 355 A.2d at 536. The court, in using the term "lie detector," probably
was referring to the polygraph because the cited authority discussed polygraphs.
40. Id. at 120, 355 A.2d at 535.
41. 31 Md. App. at 120, 355 A.2d at 536.
42. Id. at 120, 355 A.2d at 536. Similar reasoning could lead a court to conclude that no
difference exists between the functioning of an automobile, an airplane, and a ship because
all are designed for the same purpose-to move people.
43. This is not the final example in the sense that no more examples exist. In fact, dozens
of other examples of judicial scientific inaccuracies exist. The author is collecting such ex-
amples for use in another study.
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recently had fired a gun. When a gun is discharged, the gases ex-
ploding from the ammunition leave nitrate and nitrite particles on
the hand that held the weapon. The paraffin test is used to deter-
mine whether the suspect has traces of these substances on his
hands."
The first appellate decision to approve of paraffin test evidence
was Commonwealth v. Westwood.45 In Westwood, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court upheld the admission of gunpowder resi-
due evidence of nitrates and nitrites despite testimony by a chem-
ist for the defense that the chemical test would produce an
identical reaction with many other substances that might adhere to
the hand, including substances found in any household." The
court upheld the technique because it believed that the test was
fairly reliable, if not infallible.
This precedent survived until the 1950's, when evidence ap-
peared in legal and technical literature demonstrating that the test
results not only were nonspecific for gunpowder residues, but that
the likelihood that an accurate conclusion could be drawn from the
test was less than fifty percent.47 The Supreme Court of Colorado
reversed a conviction based on the paraffin test because the test
enjoyed no particular reputation for accuracy. 4" However, not until
Interpol published a report on scientific methods of identification
that included a condemnation of the paraffin test as unreliable and
without evidentiary value4" did the death knell sound for the par-
44. The particular technique used is described in A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note
11, § 4.12. After making a paraffin cast of the suspect's hands, the inside of the cast is then
treated with a chemical solution. If blue specks form on the paraffin, the suspect might have
fired a gun recently.
45. 324 Pa. 289, 188 A. 304 (1946).
46. Id. at 296-300, 188 A. at 307-09.
47. See, e.g., Turkel & Lipman, Unreliability of Dermal Nitrate Test for Gunpowder, 46
J. CRim. L. CRIMINOLOGY & PomcC ScI. 281 (1955). But see Conrad, Evidential Implications
of the Dermal Nitrate Test, 44 MARQ. L. Rv. 500 (1961).
48. Brooke v. People, 139 Colo. 388, 339 P.2d 993 (1959). Accord Born v. State, 397 P.2d
924 (Okla. Crim. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 1000 (1965); Clarke v. State, 218 Tenn. 259,
402 S.W.2d 863 (1966).
49. Note, INr'L CrM. PoLic R v., Jan. 1968, at 28. The report was actually quite
scathing:
The [First Interpol Seminar on Scientific Aspects of Police Work] did not con-
sider the traditional paraffin test to be of any value, neither as evidence to put
before the courts, nor even as a sure indication for the police officer. The par-
ticipants were of the opinion that this test should no longer be used.
554 [Vol. 25:545
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aifim test.
Meanwhile, forensic laboratory technicians experimented with a
new technique that uses the same methodology for the collection of
gunpowder residues, the paraffin glove. 50 This technique, however,
uses different chemicals to test for the presence of barium, anti-
mony, and lead-elements that are not found around the house in
the same quantities as they appear on the hands of a person who
has fired a gun. Forensic scientists initially were confident that the
new test was relatively specific for gunpowder residues and suf-
fered none of the infirmities of the old paraffin test.
In 1971, the court that had first approved dermal nitrate evi-
dence had an opportunity to consider the new test. In Common-
wealth v. Farrior,51 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the
admission of evidence given by two "criminologists" who had used
the new paraffin glove test for gunpowder residues. Ironically, in
supporting its decision, the court cited Commonwealth v. West-
wood,52 which had approved the use of dermal nitrate evidence,
evidence that experts criticized so Tesoundingly for its unreliabil-
ity.53 The court in Farrior apparently was unaware not only of the
decisions that had rejected dermal nitrate evidence as unreliable,
but also that the barium-lead-antimony was an entirely different
technique. The court in Farrior may have reached the correct con-
clusion,5 but it certainly was based on the wrong reason.
The cited examples indicate that the courts not only have failed
to determine properly the discipline that must confer general ac-
ceptance, but that they also have used general acceptance without
understanding what was being generally accepted. Courts experi-
ence difficulty determining whether the underlying principle, the
instrument that measures certain data, or a technique devised to
evaluate the data requires general acceptance.
Id. at 28.
50. This technique is sometimes called the Harrison-Gilroy method.
51. 446 Pa. 31, 283 A.2d 684 (1971).
52. 324 Pa. 285, 188 A. 304 (1946).
53. See, e.g., Turkel & Lipman, supra note 47.
54. The decision is correct if the barium-lead-antimony test does not suffer from the same
deficiencies as the dermal nitrate test, an assumption that is neither accepted nor rejected
in this Article.
1984]
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C. Evolution of a Scientific Technique
The process of bringing novel forensic evidence to life, like any
scientific inquiry, has a certain logical progression. In tracing this
progression, the following stages may be isolated:
Stage 1: A theory is postulated.
Stage 2: Experiments are designed to verify the validity of
the theory.
Stage 3: If the theory's validity is not disproven after a
searching inquiry and empirical testing, it is "proven" valid
and a court then appropriately may take judicial notice of the
theory.5 5 This result is unlikely to occur at this stage, how-
ever, because no vehicle exists for translating the theory into
relevant evidence in a law suit.
Stage 4: A technique is devised, or an instrument is
designed and built, that will permit the theory to be applied
practically in a forensic setting.
Stage 5: After devising a methodology, further tests must
demonstrate a positive correlation between the results and the
underlying theory. This stage is necessary to prove that the
effects observed are not the result of some unidentified cause.
Stage 6: After the test has been shown to yield reliable re-
sults that are relevant to disputed issues in a law suit, a court
then may admit these results properly into evidence, and a
qualified expert may interpret the results before the jury.
A survey of cases applying the Frye test, especially those cases
admitting evidence based on techniques that the scientific commu-
nity has criticized, indicates that courts have accepted expert testi-
mony involving techniques that did not undergo this six-stage pro-
cess. For example, consider the identification of individuals by
means of sound spectrography. The underlying theory of voice
identification is that all human voices are unique, despite any at-
55. See MCCORMICK, supra note 6, § 204. McCormick suggested:
General scientific acceptance is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of
scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness
should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion.
[Vol. 25:545
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tempt at deception, and despite the apparent similarity of the
voices of two different individuals to the lay person. This differ-
ence can be proved and demonstrated by the use of a sound spec-
trograph. The theory of voice uniqueness, however, which the
scientifc community should have subjected to a searching stage-
two inquiry, never has been proven by empirical evidence. As long
as the theory remains a postulate, and not a proven fact, the tech-
nique of comparing voice spectrograms cannot establish the iden-
tity of a speaker with any relative degree of certainty. Upon what
basis then could a court find that voiceprint identification had
been generally accepted? If the court accepted the technique be-
cause it recognizes the sound spectrograph, the acceptance would
be meaningless. The spectrograph is a respected research tool with
many practical uses, but as used by voiceprint proponents, it pro-
duces results based on an unproven assumption. Thus, a court's
failure to examine the development of a scientific technique com-
pounds judicial misunderstanding of scientific evidence.
D. Excessive Reliance on a Single Expert
A court's necessary reliance on expert witnesses further compli-
cates the general acceptance test. In most criminal cases, for a va-
riety of reasons, only one side-the prosecution-produces expert
testimony. The trial judge, in assessing the acceptability of the
technique, will rely only on the testimony of the prosecution's ex-
pert witness. The testimony of this expert is predictable. If he did
not believe the technique was reliable, he would not be using it.
This expert is not likely to identify inadequacies or uncertainties
that may surround the technique. 56 As a technician, he may be un-
aware of research done by others or he may have accepted a proce-
dure described by others in scientific literature. Perhaps the expert
witness has accepted the published conclusions of reliability and
validity without independent verification. Even the most skilled
56. See People v. Kelley, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976) (dis-
cussed in supra text accompanying notes 22-25). A rare example of the contrary is People v.
Slone, 76 CaL App. 3d 611, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1978). In Slone, a "nationally recognized
authority [in forensic odontology] declined to offer the results of electron microscopy [in
evaluating bitemark impressions] on the ground it had not yet been validated as a scientific
identification technique." Id. at 622 n.6, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 67 n.6. Of course, the expert
already had identified the bitemark by a different method.
1984] 557
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
cross-examiner will not be able to wrest from the expert an admis-
sion that he may have been too quick to seize upon a technique. In
such a situation, the scientifically illiterate defense lawyer is at a
distinct disadvantage.
Whether the defense or the prosecution calls an expert, the ex-
pert's impartiality always can be questioned. Once aligned with
one side in the adversarial process, even an impartial expert loses
his objectivity. Although this may be an expected result of testify-
ing in a trial setting and being paid by one side, the lack of impar-
tiality subverts a fair assessment of general acceptance. Further-
more, experts frequently testify beyond the bounds of their
expertise and offer opinions about adjacent disciplines in which
they are untrained.57 Much of the blame for this phenomenon rests
on lawyers who ask experts questions that are beyond the scope of
their expertise. The lawyers may be unaware that their questions
transcend the expert's education and training. The expert, who
may have some general knowledge of fields outside of his area of
expertise may assume that the lawyer expects answers and may
answer the questions with inadequate knowledge of the necessary
facts.
In People v. Lauro,5 for example, a qualified ballistics expert
testified that the recoil of firing a shotgun could have caused a red
mark observed below the right shoulder of a murder suspect.59
This testimony was not an issue on appeal, apparently because the
defense attorney never objected to the expert's opinion. Although
the expert's testimony was partially incompetent, the appellate
court overlooked this defect. The fault was not with the expert
who merely answered the questions; the fault was with the attor-
ney who had asked and the attorney who had failed to object to
the inappropriate questions6 0
57. See infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
58. 91 Misc. 2d 706, 398 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1977).
59. Id. at 708, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
60. This phenomenon occurs in a variety of situations. For example, lawyers frequently
ask toxicologists, who identify chemical substances such as poisons and drugs, about the
general effects of drugs upon the human body as well as the effects of certain dosages. Such
questions are appropriately addressed only to medical doctors or pharmacologists, but if
asked, the toxicologist is likely to venture an answer because he may have read about these
effects. Similarly, lawyers often ask forensic pathologists, who encounter many bullets in
their examinations of gunshot wounds, to describe the workings of guns or to offer opinions
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Many, if not all, of these problems are inherent in the adver-
sarial system and result from factors other than the Frye test. The
Frye test, however, does not ameliorate these problems; it exacer-
bates them. To rectify these problems, a new standard for deter-
mining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence is needed.
III. THE NEED FOR A NEW ADMISSIBILITY TEST
A. The Inadequacies of Frye
The need for caution in dealing with forensic science is both
great and urgent. Our technology continues to advance at an ever
increasing pace. Twenty years ago, trial lawyers had not heard of
the human leukocyte antigen test61 or of analyzing blood for en-
zymes and proteins. Many sophisticated instrumental techniques
now routinely used in forensic laboratories were largely unknown
to law enforcement.12 Entirely new disciplines, such as forensic
odontology and forensic physical anthropology, have developed
only recently as separately organized scientific subspecialties.
The disciplines that did exist in forensic laboratories a genera-
tion ago have grown exponentially in their capabilities. Questioned
document examiners formerly compared handwritten and type-
written samples. Today, the questioned document examiner has
expanded his practice to include the use of sophisticated instru-
on the caliber of deformed bullets. Yet, pathologists do not study firearms or ammunition
identification. For an interesting example of misuse of an expert witness, see Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 223 Va. 721, 292 S.E.2d 362 (1982) (error to allow a chemist to testify that LSD
"made people go as far as to tear their eyes right out of their sockets, chew off an arm, jump
out of windows, do some really ... bizarre things").
61. Human leukocyte antigen tests can establish paternity much more reliably than tradi-
tional tests. See Jaffee, Comment on the Judicial Use of HLA Paternity Test Results and
Other Statistical Evidence: A Response to Terasaki, 17 J. FAM. L. 457 (1979); Protogere,
Use of Human Leukocyte Antigen Test Results to Establish Paternity, 14 IND. L. Rav. 831
(1981); Sterlek & Jacobson, Paternity Testing with the Human Leukocyte Antigen System:
A Medicolegal Breakthrough, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 511 (1980); Terasaki, Resolution by
HLA Testing of 1000 Paternity Cases Not Excluded by ABO Testing, 16 J. FAM. L. 543
(1978).
62. The new instrumental techniques may use mass spectrometers, infrared spectropho-
tometers, atomic absorption spectrophotometric analysis, ion microscopy techniques, the
scanning electron microscope, neutron activation analysis, thin layer chromatography, gas
chromatography with electron capture detection, circular dichroism spectropolarimetry, im-
munocytochemical methods, voice spectrography, x-ray diffraction, the argon ion laser, and
immunofluorescence.
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mentation and the study of inks, papers, watermarks, erasures, se-
quencing and dating of documents, microcomputer assisted word
processing equipment, and color xerographic copies.
Fingerprint identification, the oldest and best known of the fo-
rensic laboratory functions, has become far more sophisticated.
The search for latent fingerprints has evolved from routine dusting
for fingerprints with powder, or iodine fuming and silver nitrate
processing, to include such chemical methods as ninhydrin devel-
opment, and techniques such as laser processing and cyanoacrylic
ester fuming. Moreover, computer assisted fingerprint retrieval
may replace the old fingerprint card files that investigators once
searched manually.
The admission of evidence derived from the application of any
of these methods requires expert testimony. The forensic
laboratory field has grown from a few dozen well-equipped labs in
the 1950's to several hundred well-staffed and superbly equipped
multi-functional state and regional laboratories. From the few hun-
dred individuals who routinely testified as experts in forensic anal-
ysis, the field now includes thousands of forensic technicians and
examiners.
The expansion of techniques and the growth in the number of
laboratories have caused considerable problems. Many laboratories
experience difficulty in finding staff to perform the new functions.
Laboratories often hire people who are not fully qualified or appro-
priately trained in forensic methodologies. Increasifigly, experts
reach erroneous conclusions and make misidentifications even in
disciplines as old and widespread as fingerprint identification. 3
63. A number of cases have involved fingerprint experts who either intentionally
fabricated incriminating fingerprint evidence or who made erroneous identifications. See,
e.g., Brunelle, Science and Practice Committee Report (1976), IDWNTIFICATMON NEws, Aug.
1976, at 7 (section on fingerprint fabrication); Dunleavy, Fabricated Identification De-
tected, IDENTnFICATION NEws, Dec. 1982, at 12. Experts in other fields occasionally are dis-
covered to have perjured themselves. See, e.g., People v. Comille, 95 Il. 2d 497, 448 N.E.2d
857 (1983) (state arson investigator who had testified repeatedly for the prosecution was an
imposter).
Fingerprint specialists began a certification process for latent print examiners in 1977.
Although initially some 750 of the practicing fingerprint examiners were "grandfathered" in,
a great many examinations are conducted to test the proficiency of technicians seeking certi-
fication. In a report on the certification program presented by George J. Bonebrake, Execu-
tive Secretary of the Certification Board, published in a Newsletter of the Chesapeake Bay
Division of the IAI in February, 1982, he stated that as of January 1, 1982, 172 law enforce-
[Vol. 25:545
1984] ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Laboratories maintained by public authorities have not fared
well when subjected to independent testing. The Forensic Science
Foundation recently completed a three-year study of forensic labo-
ratories and concluded that an appalling number of laboratories
reported erroneous results." About 250 crime laboratories took
part in at least one of the many tests that were offered. "[I]n blood
typing, 94 of the 132 laboratories, or 71.2%, got unacceptable re-
sults. [Eighty-eight] laboratories tried to match .22 caliber bullets
from two different weapons. Nine laboratories were in error, and
four had inconclusive results." 5 Other test results showed that
34% of the laboratories could not match paint samples; 22% could
not spot the difference between three metal samples; 50% could
not identify dog hairs; and 18% failed to analyze document speci-
mens correctly.6"
The Frye test does not recognize, understand, or evaluate the
inherent problems present in the rapid growth of the nation's fo-
rensic laboratories. The expert testifying in a particular case is cer-
tain to be impressive in the presentation of findings. After all, the
expert and his colleagues use the test daily and have staked their
professional reputations on its accuracy. Testimony that a scientist
ment officers had taken the certification exam "with 82 or 47% passing." Bonebrake empha-
sized that "the certification test is not an easy one and should be approached with careful
study and preparation." He also revealed that all but one of the 90 who failed the test failed
the comparison of latent fingerprints. "That is, they failed to correctly compare 12 of the 15
latent prints or made one or more erroneous identifications." Because fingerprint experts do
not have to be certified to qualify as experts in court, many of the "experts" who failed the
exam possibly are testifying in court on fingerprint identification.
64. Mooney, President's Address at the Annual Meeting of the International Association
for Identification (1979). Mooney is a forensic scientist and officer of a distinguished associa-
tion of crime laboratory specialists. See also LEAA Newsletter, Sept. 1978. A follow-up
study published in 1983 on the testing of toxicology laboratories also showed errors in the
analyses performed by the participating laboratories, Peat, Finnigan & Finkle, Proficiency
Testing in Forensic Toxicology: A Feasibility Study, 28 J. FoRENSIC SCL 139 (1983). Also, in
1981, the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors-Laboratory Accreditation
Board was incorporated. The Board promulgates standards for the performance of most
forensic laboratory functions, evaluates personnel in terms of education, training and expe-
rience, reviews laboratory management practices, inspects facilities, and observes the opera-
tional methods and instruments used in a laboratory. In 1982, the Board awarded the first
certificates of accreditation to the eight laboratories that comprise the Illinois Forensic Sci-
ence System.
65. Mooney, supra note 64.
66. Id.
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regularly performs a particular test may convince a trial judge that
the test is generally accepted, but this testimony will not reveal the
underlying problems in the reliability of forensic laboratories.
Only in rare cases will an appellate court reverse a decision
based upon unreliable expert testimony. Even if appellant's coun-
sel identifies published reports showing inherent weaknesses in a
technique used by the appellee's expert, reviewing courts have an
array of stock phrases to justify leaving the trial court's decision
undisturbed. The Frye test's insistence on general acceptance is
based on the erroneous assumption "that the scientific community
speaks with a single voice on the acceptance of novel scientific pro-
cedures. 81 7 Proceeding on this assumption, courts often find gen-
eral acceptance that is nonexistent in the early stages of the devel-
opment of a new process. Moreover, because the Frye rule places
undue reliance on the opinion of witnesses appearing only for ei-
ther the prosecution or the defense, the test does not appear to
fulfill its function as a meaningful screening device to admit relia-
ble evidence and to exclude unreliable evidence.
In April 1983, a group of lawyers and scientists met to examine
the Frye rule and its alternatives at a workshop sponsored by the
National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists. 8 The participants
divided into three working groups to consider the following charge:
You have been appointed by a judicial authority to serve as an
advisory panel on scientific matters. At this meeting, you are
asked two questions: (1) If the Frye test is retained, how should
a judge determine whether it has been met? (2) If the Frye test
is not retained, what consequences, if any, might follow? 9
The three groups, working independently, concluded unanimously
that the Frye test should be discarded.70 The conclusions of the
groups, as reported in a plenary session, coincided remarkably in
three key aspects: Frye was found to be unworkable because no
agreement could be reached on the real meaning of the test; aban-
67. Symposium Report, supra note 2, at 221.
68. See generally Symposium Report, supra note 2. The National Conference is a joint
organization comprised of members of the American Bar Association and the American As-
sociation for the Advancement of Science. Id. at 187.
69. Id. at 229.
70. Id. at 229-33.
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doning Frye did not mean that a loosely structured relevancy test
ought to be substituted;7 1 and the courts should engage in mean-
ingful screening to determine reliability of test results before ad-
mitting them.72 The conference did not reach agreement on a sub-
stitute for the Frye test or on the manner in which courts could
perform the screening function.
One group advocated the initiation of a new procedure for deal-
ing with novel expert testimony, rather than the formulation of a
new rule for admissibility:
If novel scientific evidence is to be proffered in the absence of
satisfactory legal precedent.., the judge has an obligation to
screen it prior to trial. Just what standard to use is not clear,
but it should include an evaluation of whether the jury would
give the evidence undue weight in relation to its scientific valid-
ity. [T]he judge independently should solicit information bear-
ing on the usefulness and validity of the evidence, even if the
information might not be included in the adversarial proceeding.
This could help mitigate the consequences of having one well
prepared and one poorly prepared advocate. At a pre-trial hear-
ing to pass on the admissibility of evidence, the judge should
employ loose criteria for determining who qualifies as an expert
witness. At this early stage, it might not be at all clear how to
define the scientific community with an interest in the integrity
of the evidence. The judge should not be too quick to reject the
testimony of experts from fields that might not appear to be ap-
propriate sources of scientific expertise. If the judge does admit
the evidence,. . . a special instruction to the jury should be pre-
pared that goes beyond the ordinary jury instructions concern-
ing expert testimony. It should include clear explanations of the
uncertainties about the evidence and of the opposing views con-
cerning its validity.7 3
Another group suggested that the judge consider four factors,
71. Such a test might be based on an interpretation of rule 401 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, which defines relevancy as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EvM. 401. Under this interpreta-
tion, scientific evidence that has not been shown to be reliable would nevertheless be rele-
vant because the evidence would satisfy the more or less probable test.
72. Symposium Report, supra note 2, at 229-33.
73. Id. at 231.
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among others, in deciding the admissibility issue:
(1) The reputation of the expert within the scientific commu-
nity, (2) The strengths of opposing views and the standing of the
persons who express them, (3) Whether the expert is prepared
to discuss uncertainties in the techniques used to prepare the
evidence and in the conclusions, and (4) Whether both sides to
the controversy have reasonably comparable access to scientific
authorities.7 4
The same group also advocated a wider judicial use of court-ap-
pointed experts to aid in determining the reliability issue, as well
as the development of expert panels by professional organiza-
tions.7 5 These organizations would have to avoid affiliation with
any special interest group in order to ensure a demonstrably unbi-
ased assessment of the validity of novel types of evidence.
B. The Postulates of a New Admissibility Procedure
This Article does not suggest the use of a static test such as the
Frye general acceptance rule, but rather suggests the adoption of a
flexible procedure to determine the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence. The procedure would comprise a series of options availa-
ble to the trial judge. The procedure would require the judge to
familiarize himself with certain scientific information and consider
various factors before making his ruling. The proposed options are
not radically novel in their components, and adoption of the sug-
gested procedure would not require a drastic change in our adver-
sarial system.76
The new procedure must avoid the pitfalls of the Frye test and
other admissibility tests that might exclude reliable evidence not
generally accepted because of its novelty, or admit unreliable evi-
dence that some practitioners in the field have adopted. The pro-
74. Id.
75. Id. at 232.
76. The author does not suggest the creation of special science courts or independent
tribunals to deal with complex scientific issues. Although, on the basis of experience with
the western European civil law systems, the author believes such an approach may have
merit, support for such a drastic change is not apparent. See Giannelli, supra note 11, at
1231-32 & n.269; Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial Capacity, 25 WM.
& MARY L. RaV. 675, 687-91 (1984).
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cedure also must be sufficiently flexible to permit the court to de-
termine admissibility on an ad hoc basis. This flexibility would
allow the judge to tailor the procedure to the characteristics of
widely divergent disciplines without sacrificing control.
Many techniques do not fall neatly within one field, but rather
cut across several fields by combining theories of various disci-
plines. In such situations, the new procedure should consider the
interdisciplinary standing of the theory, and provide for a struc-
tured discussion by the relevant branches of science, calculated to
provide the judge with an informed basis for deciding the issue of
admissibility. This consultation of knowledgeable scientists and
people outside the immediate group of experts concerned with the
new technique avoids the problem under the Frye test of selecting
the appropriate field in which the new test belongs.77
The new procedure must emphasize reliability of the technique
rather than its general acceptance. The means of determining the
reliability of the evidence should not hinder the litigation process.
If the new procedures is to be more successful than Frye or its
alternatives, it must ensure that courts will not admit testimony
based on techniques that do not produce accurate results, or meth-
odologies that do not provide reliable conclusions.
The paramount function of an admissiblity procedure is to en-
sure that admissible novel expert testimony is reliable and that un-
reliable evidence is excluded. This function is entirely consistent
with the general rules of relevancy, which limit the admission of
evidence to information that will aid the trier of fact in properly
determining the issues. Conclusions that lack predictability or
replicability do not aid in the proper determination of triable is-
sues. The suggested procedure should eliminate the possibility of a
jury relying on the incorrect, but persuasive, opinions of an articu-
late expert witness.
The existing admissibility tests have oversimplified the complex
and pervasive nature of scientific endeavors in our society. The be-
lief that the application of a single, mechanistic test such as the
Frye rule can determine the difficult issue of reliability in every
77. Under Frye, the fortuitous classification of a technique as belonging to a particular
field can shape the court's determination of the technique's general acceptance and, there-
fore, its admissibility. See generally supra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
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case is another example of the scientific illiteracy that hampers
courts. If the primary purpose of an admissibility test is to deter-
mine the reliability of expert opinion evidence, then an under-
standing of reliability is essential. Reliable evidence has those at-
tributes of certainty that a well informed and properly instructed
jury would assign to the evidence. Reliability may differ in degree
depending on the type of evidence. With some disciplines the jury
expects that the evidence will prove a point positively, without
possibility of error. If the court admits evidence from those disci-
plines, the evidence should fulfill the jury's expectations, or the
jury will be misled. The typical example of jury expectation of pos-
itive proof is fingerprint identification. Nearly a century of popular
literature has led the public to believe that fingerprints establish
identity without any possibility of error. Judges universally accept
that theory and, therefore, admit fingerprint identification evi-
dence because the evidence is reliable. The only issues are the ex-
pert's training and his competent performance of recognized iden-
tification procedures.
If the prosecution offers circumstantial evidence to link a de-
fendant with a crime, the jury may perceive that the evidence
proves only that the link is a possibility. A judge can admit the
evidence although it is not positive and although the process
whereby it was obtained is not infallible. Although the evidence is
not conclusive, it may be reliable if based on an assumption that
proves true in most cases. If the jury perceives that the evidence is
true in all cases, however, then a significant evidentiary problem
exists.
A judge may admit the evidence if he can ensure that the jury
will interpret correctly the information presented. This task, how-
ever, may be fraught with considerable difficulty. For example,
consider the jury's interpretation of expert testimony comparing a
hair sample found at the crime scene, and an examplar coming
from the defendant. If the testimony indicates that these two hairs
match in all microscopic detail, the jury may interpret such evi-
dence as indicating that the crime scene hair came from the de-
fendant, when that is not what the expert implies. In fact, the de-
termination of whether two hairs have a common origin is
scientifically impossible to prove by microscopic analysis. The ex-
pert can imply only that the two hairs could have a common origin.
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Typically, he would not know whether a common origin was statis-
tically probable.
Reliability, then, is a word that can have many meanings, de-
pending on the purpose for which we use the term. Reliability is
not a scientific test or an objective criterion; the term implies a
value judgment. A court may deem evidence reliable if the infor-
mation is safe for the purpose for which it is being offered, yet the
court may deem the same evidence unreliable if offered for a dif-
ferent purpose. In the context of expert testimony, reliability
should correlate the degree of certainty that the underlying tech-
niques permit with the jury's perception of this degree of certainty.
This correlation is difficult to make in today's courtrooms because
juries have been conditioned by the novels they read and the tele-
vision programs they watch to believe that science can do anything
and that scientific evidence is always accurate. When experts tes-
tify in a criminal case, the jury frequently perceives that the testi-
mony's value or reliability is far greater than the underlying princi-
ples or techniques would justify. Conversely, when the prosecutor
does not use expert testimony, the jury may believe that he has not
proven his case and, therefore, may acquit. After all, the prosecu-
tion always introduces scientific evidence on television. 8
IV. A PROPOSED PROCEDURE FOR ADMITTING NOVEL SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE
The best approach to the admissibility of scientific evidence is a
new procedure, rather than a new test. The procedure should rec-
ognize the lack of meaningful communication and real understand-
ing between lawyers and scientists, and seek to bridge this gap. In
this manner, a trial judge can make a truly informed decision on
the potential risk of error in admitting the evidence and can deter-
mine correctly whether the evidence's prejudicial effect outweighs
its probative value.
Determining the intrinsic worth of the evidence in light of its
78. This assertion is by no means flippant. Many prosecutors have complained about this
phenomenon at CLE meetings in which the author has participated. Professor Imwinkelried
makes similar observations from his experience with prosecutors in Imwinkelried, The Stan-
dard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique from the Perspective of Juror Psychol-
ogy, 28 VU.L. L. REV. 554, 559-60 (1983).
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reliability for a specific purpose should guide the admissibility pro-
cedure. The judge can better evaluate the admissibility of evidence
by emphasizing the reliability determination in three separate
stages of the litigation process: the discovery stage; the pretrial
hearing stage; and the decisionmaking stage.
A. The Discovery Stage
Although the discovery process in criminal cases is less extensive
than in civil litigation, existing rules do permit some discovery con-
cerning scientific evidence and expert testimony.7 The two basic
deficiencies in the present system of discovery are, first, the lack of
opportunity to discover and understand the nature of the expert's
involvement in the examination of evidence, and second, the lack
of a formal opportunity to depose the expert to determine his role
in the litigation. 0
In criminal cases, a party has the right to receive a copy of the
opposing side's expert reports.8 l This opportunity usually proves
peculiarly unenlightening, however, because forensic laboratory re-
ports typically disclose nothing more than the examiner's ultimate
conclusion. 2 The typical forensic laboratory report states, in es-
sence, three things: we have received evidence items a, b, and c; we
have compared them; and we have concluded x, y, and z. The con-
clusion usually is couched in such terms as: "the items are consis-
tent with one another"; "they may have a common origin"; "they
79. Rule 16(a)(1)(D) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the defendant,
upon request, "to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or
mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, which are
within the possession, custody, or control of the government"; Rule 16(b)(1)(B) gives the
government a reciprocal right of discovery. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Similar provisions are con-
tained in most state statutes or rules of court permitting discovery in criminal cases. See,
e.g., VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:14(b)(1).
80. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure allows a defendant, on motion,
to depose a prosecution expert witness if the defendant can convince the judge that "due to
exceptional circumstances of the case it is in the interest of justice that the testimony of a
prospective witness... be taken and preserved for use at trial." FED. R. CRM. P. 15(a).
81. FED. R. CRM. P. 16(a).
82. The notable exception to this obstruction of discovery is the autopsy protocol pre-
pared by forensic pathologists in medical examiners' offices. These reports are usually very
explicit and fulfill the true function of a "report." Forensic pathologists are, of course, not
considered a true part of the forensic laboratory organization, although they may work
closely with the laboratory.
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are microscopically indistinguishable"; or variations on such lan-
guage. Forensic laboratory reports do not mention the methods
used to analyze evidence, the instrumental analyses used, the ob-
jective data noted or measured, or, in a number of cases, the name
of the examiner.8 3 This information is very important in establish-
ing the reliability of the conclusions reached, and should therefore
be in the report.84
Although subject to discovery, the report does not contain any
meaningful information. Concealment seems to be the express pur-
pose of keeping forensic laboratory reports terse. The forensic lab-
oratory technicians are not necessarily responsible for the nearly
meaningless form of their reports. In discussing the topic of foren-
sic laboratory reports at forensic science meetings, many experts
have indicated that they have no objection to including in the re-
port the information that trial participants logically would expect
to find. The prosecutors who request and receive these reports,
however, prohibit the experts from including more than the mini-
mum amount of information. A clearer example of intentional frus-
tration of the discovery process cannot be imagined.
This phenomenon is especially appalling because the court later
may permit the expert to testify at trial "without prior disclosure
of the underlying facts or data. 81 5 No pretrial mechanism exists,
aside from informal discovery, for determining the process that the
expert used, or how he arrived at his conclusions. This nondisclo-
sure frustrates the underlying purpose of the discovery rules.
Clearly, the analyses conducted by forensic laboratory examiners
should contain some basic information that will make the docu-
ments worthy of the title "report." A critical requirement is that a
laboratory report contain the methodology used by the expert in
arriving at his conclusion. This information is especially important
because some evidence specimens can be examined by widely dif-
fering methods. Depending on the tests conducted and the instru-
83. Some law enforcement agencies have supervisors sign all reports. The agency may
identify the analyst of the evidence by some code known only to the organization.
84. If a scientist called to testify as an expert in a civil case examined such a report, he
would reject the report as inadequate and technically unjustifiable. Indeed, the reports filed
by examiners of evidence in civil cases are encyclopedic in comparison with crime laboratory
reports.
85. FE. R. Evm. 705.
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ments used, the degree of certainty obtained may vary from a con-
clusion expressed as a mere possibility to one of a strong
probability. 6 Without knowing the methodology that the expert
used, the opposing attorney will be unable to determine whether
an evidentiary challenge is possible, desirable, or wasteful. Addi-
tionally, the attorney's own expert will not be able to evaluate the
report because of this lack of elementary information.
Frequently, forensic laboratories have inadequate standards for
performing particular scientific analyses. Laboratory examiners
also have substantial discretion in selecting the methods of analy-
sis they will use. Examiners can use that discretion to ignore meth-
ods of analysis reputedly more accurate, but in which they have
not become proficient. These examiners may choose inappropriate
methods instead of more accurate methods that are more costly or
complicated.
A proper report also should identify the names of the actual ex-
aminers, testers, or technicians who participated in the analysis.
Additionally, appended to the report should be a summary of the
credentials of the examiner and of the person who will appear in
court as the expert witness if the case goes to trial. Requiring pre-
trial disclosure of the qualifications of the examiners and analysts
is necessary because many laboratories have encountered difficul-
ties in hiring qualified staff, and may be employing technicians
whose credentials do not qualify them as scientists or experts.
More importantly, some forensic laboratories are staffed by indi-
viduals who do not have to exhibit or prove their skills by undergo-
ing board certification. States with laws imposing certification re-
quirements for certain occupations and professions may exempt
personnel of state and local forensic laboratories from the licensing
requirement. Ironically, in some jurisdictions these unlicensed
state examiners examine their "civilian" counterparts for compe-
tency when the civilians apply for state certification.
In sum, a laboratory report should include the following facts:
the type of analysis done; who performed the analysis; the objec-
tive findings or measurements; the conclusions derived from the
86. Consider the statistical probabilities of possible innocent coincidence between a blood
analysis done in the ABO system only, as opposed to one conducted in a series of enzyme, as
well as antigen, systems.
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findings; and the basic qualifications of the examiner. Implementa-
tion of this recommendation would force "reports" to actually be
reports. A change in the law is not required; compliance with ex-
isting law could implement this recommendation.
A second recommendation for improvement of the discovery pro-
cess is for judges to exercise their discretion more freely and allow
the defense to depose prosecution experts. Forensic laboratory ex-
perts do not oppose this suggestion, nor does the recommendation
worry them. As professionals, experts do not believe that their job
is to conceal information. Many experts frequently express the
view that depositions give them the opportunity to explain in a
meaningful way the available scientific evidence, and to convince
the defense attorney that their conclusions are scientifically valid.
Such free communication between state experts and defense attor-
neys may result in fewer evidentiary challenges at trial and shorter
cross-examinations. The trial lawyer who has not had an opportu-
nity during the discovery process to explore what happened in the
laboratory will be inclined to probe the meaning of the evidence
during cross-examination of the expert. For this reason, better dis-
covery should result in shorter expert testimony at trial.
B. The Pretrial Hearing Stage
Systematic use of the motion in limine could resolve issues of
admissibility before trial. The purpose of this Article is not to de-
velop a procedure to regulate the expanded use of the motion in
limine, nor to suggest who should bear the burden of proof. In-
creased use of the motion in limine, however, is the logical result of
more meaningful discovery, at least in connection with innovative
scientific evidence. Proper laboratory protocols and reports will aid
the attorneys in determining what further inquiries are necessary
to decide whether they should raise an admissibility issue. Liti-
gators should raise the issue of disputed scientific evidence by
making a motion in limine. The proponent of the evidence may
seek to avoid a battle of experts during the trial on the issue of
reliability because such battles raise doubts in the jurors' minds.
The opponent of the evidence may use a motion in limine to ex-
clude the evidence completely.
If the parties raise the evidentiary issue for the first time at trial
and the defense moves to exclude the expert testimony because the
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expert based his opinion on a technique not generally accepted, the
court usually will conduct a voir dire on the issue outside of the
presence of the jury. The prosecutor who is alert to this eventual-
ity may need to locate an independent expert to establish the sci-
entific validity of a new process or instrument used by the local
forensic laboratory. If the trial court denies the defendant's mo-
tion, the outside expert will take the stand. He thus will bolster
the testimony of the local forensic laboratory technician, who may
qualify as an expert witness but lack the prestigious credentials of
the independent expert. To avoid having the jury hear the outside
expert's testimony, the defense should schedule the hearing before
trial.
Conversely, the prosecution may gain the same tactical advan-
tage. Prosecutors who have lost a jury trial involving novel expert
evidence may wonder whether the jury found a reasonable doubt
because of the acrimonious battle of the experts on the admissibil-
ity issue. Juries have a way of knowing far more than the parties
tell them. They know that an objection may prevent them from
hearing certain evidence. Although no empirical evidence may exist
on this point, many trial lawyers are convinced that jurors look
more skeptically at evidence admitted immediately after a long
sidebar conference or after a session out of their presence.
In addition to encouraging the use of motions in limine, judges
also should take a more active role in the process in a number of
other ways. After a party files a motion in limine, the judge should
abandon his totally passive role as an arbiter and should partici-
pate more actively in generating information that will be useful in
resolving the issue of reliability versus risk of error. The judge
need not become partisan in order to become well informed.
In most jurisdictions, judges may appoint their own experts to
evaluate innovative scientific evidence.8 7 In making such appoint-
ments, the judge should not restrict expertise to a narrow field. He
should involve impartial experts who are best able to explain scien-
tific principles and fundamental reliability issues. A judge also
should consult the technical literature to aid his understanding of
the technical and scientific issues. In the event that the reliability
of an entirely novel form of expert testimony is at issue, the judge
87. See, e.g., FF. R. Evm. 706.
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might appoint an advisory panel of scientists to study the problem,
even if this approach means postponing the trial.8
In short, a far greater degree of judicial participation in gather-
ing information on scientific issues is necessary. This increased
participation is essential to obtaining a fair determination of relia-
bility issues, particularly if one of the litigants is less prepared or
has less opportunity to secure expert testimony.8 , Judicial partici-
pation also will alleviate the excessive reliance on forensic labora-
tory witnesses to prove scientific theories that they may not under-
stand fully.
C. The Decisidnmaking Stage
After the evidence has been gathered and the information re-
viewed, the judge should base his admissibility decision on consid-
erations more clearly defined and articulated than the nebulous
general acceptance standard or a loose relevancy concept. Chief
Judge Weinstein and Professor Margaret Berger have recom-
mended that judges use a series of seven factors to assess the pro-
bative value of novel expert testimony.9 0 Justice Mark McCormick
recommended that the court consider eleven factors in making its
assessment, 91 including the factors suggested by Judge Weinstein
and Professor Berger. The eleven factors are:
(1) the potential error rate in using the technique, (2) the exis-
tence and maintenance of standards governing its use, (3) pres-
ence of safeguards in the characteristics of the technique, (4)
analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissi-
ble, (5) the extent to which the technique has been accepted by
scientists in the field involved, (6) the nature and breadth of the
inference adduced, (7) the clarity and simplicity with which the
technique can be described and its results explained, (8) the ex-
88. See Symposium Report, supra note 2, at 232.
89. In Bond v. Commonwealth, - Va. , 311 S.E.2d 769 (1984), the Virginia Su-
preme Court recognized that the opinion of a witness whom the judge has found to be an
expert is accorded significant weight by the jury. Additionally, use of expert witnesses is
expensive. The court recognized that, "[d]rawing upon the public fisc, the prosecution can
afford to finance a duel of experts; an indigent defendant cannot." Id. at , 311 S.E.2d at
772.
90. 3 J. WmsTm & M. BERGER, WENSTEMN'S EVIDENCE 1 702[03].
91. McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a New Approach to Admissibility, 67 IowA
L. REV. 879, 911-12 (1982).
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tent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury,
(9) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the
technique, (10) the probative significance of the evidence in the
circumstances of the case, and (11) the care with which the tech-
nique was employed in the case.92
Use of these standards would allow a judge to make a decision
based upon significant factual information. The burden on the trial
judge would be greater than it has been in the past, but such a
solution is preferable to the Frye test. Presently, expert witnesses
who only use, rather than develop, a technique can testify that the
scientific community generally accepts the technique. Courts thus
find the technique reliable, a conclusion that does not necessarily
follow. In so ruling, judges have become rubber stamps for expert
opinions on general acceptance and reliability. If judges follow the
procedure for dealing with novel scientific evidence outlined in this
Article, they will make the decision on acceptance and reliability
by applying meaningful factors to information they purposefully
have solicited. This increased judicial participation will help re-
move the "scientifically illiterate" label bestowed upon the courts
by expert witnesses.
V. CONCLUSION
The approach recommended in this Article may not require a
departure from the Frye rule. Indeed, courts could implement this
approach in conjunction with any existing test for admissibility.
The courts, however, have not followed this approach in interpret-
ing Frye, and are unlikely to adopt it without a total departure
from the established Frye jurisprudence.
When dealing with some types of scientific evidence and expert
opinion, the means used to decide questions of admissibility will
not make a difference; any admissibility test would produce the
same result. In certain cases, however, the decision on admissibility
is very much a function of the test a court adopts. Adoption of the
procedure suggested in this Article will permit the courts to make
a more informed decision based on a clearer understanding of the
scientific strengths and weaknesses of the novel evidence before
92. Id. (citations omitted).
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the court.
This Article does not posit that these suggestions represent the
ultimate solution to the problem of admissibility of novel types of
expert testimony or that these proposals cannot be improved upon.
These suggestions are offered in the hope that their consideration
may improve the judicial factfinding process, contribute to the
eradication of the scientific illiteracy of the bar and judiciary, in-
still a better understanding of the potential and limitations of ex-
pert testimony, and alleviate some of the pressing problems that
continue to plague courts that must deal with new scientific
developments.
